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Abstract 
Health information exchange (HIE) platforms could increase the efficiency of health care services 
by enabling providers to instantly access the medical records of their patients. However, these 
benefits cannot be realized unless patients disclose their information on HIE platforms. We examine 
actual privacy decisions made by patients on an HIE platform, study the influence of physicians’ 
recommendations on patients’ decisions, and explore the process through which this effect takes 
place. By analyzing a unique data set consisting of the privacy decisions of 12,444 patients, we show 
that contrary to common belief, patients do not simply follow physician recommendations, but rather 
carefully consider the risks and benefits of providing consent. We show that competition among 
medical providers does not hinder patient participation in HIEs, but that providers’ decisions to ask 
for consent are primarily driven by the potential benefits of HIE for themselves and their patients. 
Keywords: Health Information Exchange, Patient Privacy, Information Disclosure. 
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1 Introduction 
A health information exchange (HIE) is a multisided 
platform that connects different stakeholders in the 
health care market and enables them to electronically 
share the medical information of their patients with 
each other (Kuperman, 2011; Miller & Tucker, 2014). 
Although HIE platforms have the potential to radically 
improve the quality and reduce the costs of medical 
services (Janakiraman, Park, Demirezen, & Kumar, 
2017; Miller & Tucker, 2011a; Yaraghi, 2015), 
increasing the number of patient consents is of critical 
importance to the success of these platforms (Adler-
Milstein, Bates, & Jha, 2011; Petrova, M. Barclay, S. 
S. Barclay & S. I. G. Barclay, 2017). The numerous 
challenges in managing and protecting patient privacy 
(Miller & Tucker, 2011b; Yaraghi & Gopal, 2018) 
impede the growth and expansion of HIE systems 
(Yasnoff, 2016), therefore shedding light on the factors 
that affect patients’ privacy choices is of significant 
importance to policy makers and practitioners.  
From a theoretical perspective, the process of 
information disclosure on HIE platforms is unique and 
warrants careful examination. This is due to the fact 
that the decision to disclose information is not made by 
patients independently and is rather affected by the 
preferences of both patients and their physicians. So 
far, the literature has focused on individuals as the sole 
decision makers and has not yet examined the settings 
in which the privacy decision of an individual is 
affected by the preferences of others. As we discuss 
later in the paper, privacy decision-making in the HIE 
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context is a two-stage process in which patients can 
make a decision about sharing their medical records 
only after they are asked by a medical provider. In 
other words, patients cannot make a decision unless 
medical providers give them a chance to do so; 
therefore, ignoring the role of medical providers and 
modeling the observed privacy choice as a function of 
the utility of the patient alone will lead to incorrect 
inferences.  
From the empirical perspective, since this study relies 
on actual privacy decisions rather than stated 
preferences, its conclusions do not suffer from the 
privacy paradox (Norberg, D. R. Horne, & D. A. 
Horne, 2007), which implies that contrary to planned 
behavior theory (Ajzen, 1991), individuals continue to 
willingly disclose their private information despite 
growing concerns over their privacy (Madden, Fox, 
Smith, & Vitak, 2007). 
The purpose of our research is to bridge the above-
mentioned theoretical and empirical gaps by modeling  
privacy decision-making in the context of an HIE 
platform as a process that involves medical providers 
and patients as two distinct but related agents. Our 
research identifies the factors that determine the 
choices of medical providers and patients to, 
respectively, ask for, and provide consent, and 
illuminates the extent to which physicians influence 
their patients’ decisions. In this research, we rely on a 
deidentified data set that includes the actual consent 
choices and other attributes of 12,444 patients who 
visited 186 medical providers in western New York. 
The data set has been provided by HEALTHeLINK, 
the HIE for western New York. 
Contrary to common belief, we observe that once 
given a chance to make a decision about privacy, 
patients do not always follow the recommendation of 
their physicians but rather carefully consider the risks 
and benefits of providing consent. For patients, the 
number of physicians involved in their medical care, 
volume of medical records on the HIE, and the 
interaction between these two are positively associated 
with the likelihood of providing consent. On the other 
hand, the existence of medical records related to 
stigmatized conditions, such as behavioral health 
issues and mental illness, reduces the likelihood of 
providing consent.  
We show that provider decisions to ask for consent are 
primarily motivated by the potential benefits of the 
HIE for themselves and their patients rather than by the 
potential financial risks associated with the HIE that 
medical providers may face due to patient migration to 
other providers.  
While only a quarter of HIEs in the US consider 
themselves financially sustainable and cite privacy 
concerns as a major impediment to their growth 
(Rudin, Motala, Goldzweig, & Shekelle, , 2014; Karen 
et al., 2016), due to strong local and state level support, 
HEALTHeLINK has overcome the privacy concerns 
of the patients and is financially sustainable. Despite 
the success of this platform, the majority of the 
remaining HIEs in the country are still struggling with 
this issue and are striving to persuade patients to 
provide consent so that they can increase their value 
proposition to their members and eventually become 
financially sustainable (Tripathi, Delano, Lund, & 
Rudolph, 2009; Adler-Milstein, Bates, & Jha, 2013; 
Kho et al., 2015). Therefore, the findings of this 
research have significant managerial implications for 
the majority of HIE platforms in the country that still 
have low patient participation levels due to privacy 
concerns.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 reviews the research on information technology and 
privacy within, respectively, the health economics and 
information systems literatures. This section also 
describes the HIE setting of the current study. Section 
3 describes the variables in our model, sets out the 
empirical background, and presents our hypotheses. 
Section 4 develops our conceptual model and Section 
5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion on the 
theoretical and practical implications of our findings. 
2 Related Work and Current 
Focus 
Widespread adoption and use of health information 
technologies (HIT) is estimated to reduce the costs of 
health care services by $371 billion per year (Hillestad 
et al., 2005). Given these potential benefits, the federal 
government has invested as much as $26 billion dollars 
to incent the adoption and use of various HIT 
applications in the health care sector (Agha, 2014). The 
findings of studies on the impact of such investments 
are not consistent; while some have observed 
significant improvement in quality and efficiency 
(Javitt, Rebitzer & Reisman, 2008;  McCullough, 
Casey, Mosocovice & Prasad, 2010; Miller & Tucker, 
2011a), others show modest (Borzekowski, 2009 ) or 
no improvements at all (Agha, 2014; DesRoches et al., 
2010; Furukawa, Raghu & Shao, 2010). Researchers 
have also examined the drivers of HIT adoption and 
exchange of health information. Miller and Tucker 
(2014) show that unlike other two-sided platforms, 
focusing on large, marquee users is not an optimal 
strategy for attracting smaller users to HIE platforms. 
This is consistent with earlier studies that show that the 
effects of scale on hospitals’ decisions to adopt HIT 
diminishes over time (McCullough, 2008). On the 
other hand, stricter state regulations on privacy and the 
existence of rules that facilitate the use of electronic 
medical records in courts are shown to impede HIT 
adoption and exchange of health information (Miller & 
Tucker, 2009, 2012).  
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A recent stream of research focuses on privacy 
antecedents by investigating how individuals make 
privacy decisions and by examining the factors that 
lead them to disclose their personal information.  
Researchers have studied the role of emotions 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2011), uncertainty (Pavlou, 
Liang & Xue, 2007) and information transparency 
(Awad & Krishnan, 2006). Despite notable exceptions 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2011), previous research 
examines privacy in the broad context of online 
disclosure of either personal or financial data and does 
not examine how privacy concerns of individuals shift 
when it comes to medical data. Furthermore, the 
distinctive features of HIEs add to the complexity of 
the privacy decision-making process and consequently 
necessitates a careful examination of patients’ consent 
choices on HIE platforms. Regardless of these 
differences, our understanding of the antecedents and 
outcomes of privacy in HIE settings is limited to few 
studies on the impact of privacy regulations on the 
development of HIEs (Adjerid, Acquisti, Telang, 
Padman & Adler-Milstein, 2015) and the 
association between patients’ characteristics and their 
consent choices (Yaraghi, Sharman, Gopal,  Singh,  
Ramesh, 2015). In addition, previous work is 
exclusively focused on individuals as the only decision 
makers and does not examine how others may 
influence such decisions. In this regard, the principal 
contributions of our research are twofold. First, the 
study analyzes actual privacy decisions made by 
patients in the context of an HIE and uncovers the 
factors underlying their choices. Second, and more 
importantly, we not only study the influence of 
physicians’ recommendations on patients’ decisions, 
but also examine the process through which this effect 
takes place. 
In particular, the following contributions distinguish 
this research from our previous research (Yaraghi, 
Sharman et al., 2015) on patient consent. First and 
foremost, in the current research, we develop a 
theoretical framework that explains the interaction of 
patients and physicians and describes how these two 
parties consider their risks and benefits to make a 
decision regarding giving and asking for consent. 
However, our previous research was exploratory and 
hence did not provide a theoretical framework. 
Second, given the theoretical development in this 
paper, the number of variables included in the models 
is larger, while in our previous research, the variables 
were mostly limited to patients’ demographics. While 
in this research we examine the variables related to the 
cost and benefits of asking for and providing consent, 
from the standpoints of both physicians and patients, 
our previous research limited the variables used in the 
model to patient demographics, and only included 
patients’ age, gender, the complexity of their medical 
conditions, and whether a primary care physician was 
involved in their care. The richer theory and larger set 
of variables in the current research allowed us to shed 
more light on the decision-making process and provide 
specific policy recommendations and strategies to 
increase consent. This was not a possibility in our prior 
research mainly because the demographic variables 
were fixed and could not be easily changed to affect 
any outcome. Third, the theory and operationalization 
of a larger number of variables allowed us to focus on 
the process of decision-making, while, previously, we  
only examined the outcome of this process. That is, in 
previous research we examined the effects of the 
above-mentioned factors on the likelihood that a 
patient would provide consent, while in this research, 
we model a sequential process, allowing us to also 
examine the effect of physician-related factors on the 
likelihood of providing consent. Fourth, in this 
research, we examine the role of physicians in the 
sequential process of decision-making; in contrast, the 
role of physicians in this process was not adequately 
considered in the previous research because it was 
limited to a binary variable indicating if a primary care 
physician was involved in the care process of the 
patient. Finally, our empirical analysis in the current 
research includes multiple models and is significantly 
more robust than previous research. While in the 
current research, we implement bivariate and zero-
inflated models to respectively account for the 
sequential nature of the process and the role of 
physicians in asking for consent, our prior research 
implemented only a logistic equation that examined 
the role of a limited set of variables on the likelihood 
of consent.  
2.1 Setting 
In this study, we analyze the consent choices of 
patients in western New York using deidentified data 
that are provided by HEALTHeLINK, the HIE of 
western New York. This HIE was created as a 
collaborative effort among community health care 
providers, large hospital systems, major laboratories 
and radiology centers, and regional health care payers. 
Currently, physicians can access the HIE to download 
the medical records that are created by major medical 
data providers. Such providers include the entire 
laboratories, imaging centers, and hospitals in the 
region, thus creating three types of medical data: 
laboratory reports, radiology reports, and hospital 
transcriptions. Although the medical data of patients 
are available on the HIE, they are not accessible to 
members without patients’ explicit consent. The state 
of New York requires HIEs to implement an opt-in 
policy and obtain the consent of patients before sharing 
their medical records with their members. Patient 
consent is acquired at the offices of participating 
physicians. Patients can either allow physicians to have 
complete access or deny all physicians access to their 
medical records under any circumstance. Within each 
of these two choices, patients can further exclude 
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certain physicians. That is, patients can disclose their 
medical records to every HIE member except certain 
physicians, or disclose their records to no one, except 
in a medical emergency. This format effectively gives 
patients full control over who can access their records. 
The consent database used in this study only shows 
whether a patient has allowed or denied access to his 
medical records and does not specify if some 
physicians were excluded.  
There is no restriction on the number of times that a 
practice can ask a patient for consent. However, once 
a practice asks for consent, practices must record the 
patient’s decision. Although patients can change their 
consent decision anytime they wish, practices rarely 
ask the patient to make another decision once the 
patient has made an initial decision. We can identify 
the number of times that a practice has asked for the 
consent of a patient in our data set by looking at the 
number of times that the consent type has been 
updated. In our data set, of 12,444 patients, only 813 
(6.5%) of patients have been asked more than once to 
provide consent, and of these, only 63 (0.5%) patients 
have changed their consent type.   
3 Theoretical Framework 
In this section we use a calculus perspective of 
information privacy—similar to what has been 
previously used to examine privacy decisions in other 
contexts such as GPS enables mobile services (Xu, 
Teo, Tan & Agarwal, 2009) and e-commerce (Dinev & 
Hart, 2006)—to describe the rationale on why various 
characteristics of medical practices and patients should 
affect their decision to ask for and provide consent to 
sharing records on an HIE, respectively.   
Another closely related theoretical framework to our 
research is communication privacy management 
(CPM) theory. It was first proposed by Petronio (1991) 
to explain how people manage their privacy across 
interpersonal, family, and health communication 
contexts (Griffin, 2006, p. 170). According to CPM, 
people believe that they own their private information 
(Braithwaite, 1991) and set personal rules to control it. 
When an individual discloses his private information 
to others, the recipients also become co-owners of that 
information, and the co-owners together negotiate 
mutually agreeable privacy rules for the shared 
information. If this negotiation does not happen 
properly, or if co-owners fail to follow the new rules, 
boundary turbulence is the likely result. CPM argues 
that five factors are influential in forming the privacy 
rules: culture, gender, motivation, context, and 
risk/benefit ratio. The value of privacy and 
individualism in the cultural background of individuals 
affects the extent to which they disclose private 
information (Lowry, Cao, & Everard, 2011). Prior 
research shows that, as compared with females, males 
are generally more pessimistic about the ramifications 
of private information disclosure (Petronio & Martin, 
1986) and are less likely to disclose emotional 
information to family members and friends (Papini, 
Farmer, Clark, Micka, & Barnett,, 1990). Petronio 
(1991) argues that interest in or attraction to certain 
people can lead an individual to loosen privacy 
boundaries. The contextual factors refer to traumatic 
events, such as the diagnosis of AIDS and other 
stigmatized medical conditions, the loss of a limb and 
physical paralysis that may dampen the effects of other 
four factors (Griffin, 2006, p. 171). The cost/benefit 
ratio refers to the similar mental calculations that both 
social exchange theory (Emerson, 1976; Homans, 
1958) and privacy calculus theory (Dinev & Hart, 
2006) claim that individuals make before establishing 
relationships with others and disclosing information to 
others, respectively. According to this criterion, 
individuals set their privacy boundaries by evaluating 
the risks of disclosing private information against its 
benefits.  
Note that the emphasis of this research is on the 
process of decision-making and the interplay between 
the utility functions of patients and providers. That is, 
our main focus in on the form of the utility functions 
rather than their input variables. In Section 4, we 
develop an econometric model using these functions to 
examine the process of privacy decision-making.  
Within this framework we discuss the risks and 
benefits of obtaining and proving consent from the 
perspective of both medical practices and patients. 
While, for patients, information disclosure and 
providing consent to share medical records on an HIE 
is a privacy decision, for medical practices, asking 
patients for their consent can be better interpreted as an 
adoption decision. The difference in terminology 
(privacy vs. adoption) arises from the fact that patients 
have to decide if they want to disclose some of their 
privately held medical information while practices 
have to decide whether to encourage their patients to 
do so. When a practice asks a patient for consent, it 
does not disclose any of its own private information, 
but rather it encourages another agent (the patient) to 
do so. A patient’s decision to provide consent will 
allow the medical practice to effectively adopt the HIE, 
which will provide some benefits to medical practices 
while also exposing patients to certain risks. We 
discuss these risks and benefits next. 
3.1 Patients’ Benefits from Providing 
Consent to Share Records on an 
HIE 
HIEs enable physicians to easily access the medical 
records of their patients and thus helps them to order 
fewer redundant procedures and make better medical 
decisions (Ayabakan, Bardhan, Zheng, Kirksey, 2017; 
Yaraghi, 2015). These outcomes would directly benefit 
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patients, as they would receive higher quality of 
medical services at a lower cost. However, these 
benefits are not homogenously distributed among all 
patients; by allowing their records to become 
accessible through an HIE, those patients that have 
more medical records available on the HIE could 
benefit more from the platform as compared to 
patients with fewer records. This is due to the fact that 
patients with more medical records incur a higher cost 
for providing physicians with access to their records 
through alternative channels; without HIEs, such 
patients must either personally obtain hardcopies of 
their medical records and provide them to their 
physicians, or they must ask their providers to request 
previous medical records directly from other 
providers. Medical records that are shared on 
hardcopies by patients themselves or through fax or 
mail are often incomplete, difficult to interpret, and 
prone to errors (Shortliffe, 1999; Varon & Marik, 
2002). Obtaining medical records through such 
alternative channels is not only expensive and 
inconvenient for patients (Ozcan & Kazley, 2008) but 
also exposes them to the risks that arise from 
practicing medicine based on incomplete and 
incorrect medical histories. The inconvenience of 
receiving services through conventional channels is a 
driver for adopting new service channels (Boyer, 
Hallowell, & Roth, 2002; Xue, Hitt, & Chen, 2011). 
Since sharing records on paper is more difficult for 
patients who have a higher number of medical 
records, they will benefit more from consenting to 
share their medical records on HIE as a more 
convenient alternative.  
Hypothesis 1.1: An increase in the number of a 
patient’s medical records leads to an increase in 
the likelihood of providing consent.  
When multiple physicians are involved in the medical 
care of a patient, the patient has to provide all of them 
with access to his or her medical records. As the 
number of different physicians who are involved in 
the care process of the patient increases, the 
complexity of sharing hardcopies also increases, and, 
hence, the benefit to the patient derived by consenting 
to share medical records on an HIE increases as well. 
In cases where physicians do not have access to prior 
medical records, they are more likely to repeat 
medical procedures (Ayabakan et al., 2017; 
Eftekhari, Yaraghi, Singh, Gopal, Ramesh, 2017). 
Normally, the costs for such unnecessary procedures 
are a burden on patients. Therefore, patients who visit 
multiple physicians are likely to be more willing to 
provide consent to reduce the costs associated with 
reexamination. 
Hypothesis 1.2: An increase in the number of a 
patient’s medical providers leads to an increase 
in the likelihood of providing consent.  
So far, we have argued that the benefits of HIEs are 
more salient for two groups of patients: those patients 
who have more medical records and those who have 
more physicians involved in their care. Note that 
these two groups are not necessarily the same. Certain 
patients may have many records but visit few 
physicians; similarly, some patients may have 
relatively few medical records but receive medical 
care from many physicians. Patients who benefit the 
most from HIEs are those who have both a large 
number of records and many physicians involved in 
their medical care. As such, these patients will stand 
to gain the most benefits from consenting to share 
their medical records on an HIE.   
Note that patients who have more medical records 
and visit more physicians, are much more likely to be 
sicker and, consequently, to require more substantial 
medical care. Therefore, both the number of medical 
records and the number of physicians involved are 
factors that are likely to be confounded by the 
severity of the medical condition, in that interaction 
between these two variables can typically be viewed 
as measures of the overall health condition of a 
patient. Since one of the functionalities of HIEs is to 
provide instant access to medical records, the 
potential benefit derived from consenting to share 
medical records on an HIE increases along with the 
patient’s demand for medical care. 
Hypothesis 1.3: The number of medical providers 
moderates the relationship between the number 
of medical records and a patient’s likelihood of 
consent such that when the number of medical 
providers is lower the association between the 
number of medical records and the likelihood of 
consent is weaker than it is when the number of 
medical providers is higher. 
3.2 Patients’ Risks from Providing 
Consent to Share Records on an 
HIE 
There is substantial evidence in the medical literature 
that shows that social attitudes toward patients with 
mental illness have worsened over the past two 
decades (Angermeyer  Matschinger & Schomerus , 
2013), and disclosure of medical data may have 
emotional or reputational risks for patients with 
mental illnesses. For example, psychiatric patients 
may be stigmatized by society (Link, 1987), friends 
and family members (Moses, 2010) and even health 
care providers (Arvaniti et al. 2009). By providing 
consent and allowing medical providers to have 
access to their medical histories, patients with mental 
illnesses and behavioral health issues will expose 
themselves to risks of being stigmatized and may 
even receive lower quality care from medical 
providers who may be biased against such conditions.  
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While breach of medial data could lead to emotional 
and even medical hardships for certain patients, in the 
US context at least, it rarely leads to employment and 
health insurance discrimination. Three federal laws 
protect employees against discrimination based on 
health status in the workplace (Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq). As such, 
employers are legally barred from using data from an 
HIE to discriminate against employees. Similarly, in 
the US, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), (42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. 2010) makes 
it illegal to deny health insurance coverage or charge 
disproportionately higher premiums on patients with 
preexisting medical conditions.  
In spite of these legal protections, however, patients, 
especially those with stigmatized medical conditions, 
may nevertheless worry about unsanctioned 
discrimination on the part of employers or health 
insurance companies, or the possibility of future 
discrimination, should current laws and protections 
change. 
Hypothesis 2: Patients with stigmatized medical 
conditions are less likely to provide consent. 
3.3 Providers’ Benefits from Obtaining 
Consent to Share Records on an 
HIE  
Unless the flow of information on HIEs is authorized 
by patients, HIEs will not substantially affect medical 
practices in any form. The risks and benefits of HIEs 
for practices will only be realized after a practice 
obtains the consent of a patient to release medical 
records on an HIE. While physicians may be reluctant 
to share the medical records of their own patients with 
others, they often do need access to medical records 
prepared by other medical providers for their patients 
(Yaraghi, Du, Sharman, Gopal, & Ramesh, 2013, 
Yaraghi et al.. 2013). Without HIEs, physicians either 
have to depend on their patients for the records of 
services provided elsewhere, or must allocate staff 
time to contact other medical providers and ask them 
to send the medical records. If patients were to 
provide consent on an HIE, medical practices could 
save the resources that otherwise would have been 
spent on retrieving the records from other providers 
(Wright et al., 2010). Note that this potential benefit 
of HIEs is only realized for those patients that have a 
history of treatment and medical procedures recorded 
by other providers. In cases where a patient does not 
have any prior records or a given physician is the 
patient’s only provider, HIEs will be less beneficial. 
Therefore, medical practices who have a higher 
proportion of patients previously or currently treated 
by other providers will benefit more from their 
patients consenting to share medical records on an 
HIE and, hence, are also more likely to encourage 
their patients to do so.   
Hypothesis 3.1: Medical providers who treat a larger 
number of patients previously or currently 
treated by other providers are more likely to ask 
patients for consent.  
As discussed before, the availability of alternative 
channels has a strong influence on the potential value 
of HIEs as a means of accessing patients’ medical 
records. If medical practices could access patient 
records through other channels, HIEs would be of less 
value to them, and, thus, they would have less 
incentive to ask their patients to provide consent. 
Proximity to main data providers offers easier and 
faster access to medical records for practices in dense 
urban areas compared to those in rural areas. As Vest 
and Gamm, (2010) note “HIE transactions could be 
especially important in support of rural patients, 
physicians, and hospitals who need the clinical 
information associated with rural patients’ visits to 
urban specialists or hospitals. Such information can 
ensure effective management when such patients 
return to the care of their local provider.” Moreover, to 
coordinate care, medical practices have to allocate 
substantial time and effort to search and obtain 
previous medical records of their patients through 
phone, fax, email, or mail (Hendrich, Chow, 
Skierczynski & Lu, 2008). HIEs significantly reduce 
efforts required for care coordination by streamlining 
this process and increasing its efficiency (Frisse et al., 
2012; Hendrich et al., 2008). Since practices in rural 
areas tend to be smaller with fewer human resources, 
this feature of HIEs will be much more crucial and 
beneficial for them, as compared to their urban 
counterparts, because HIEs could free up relatively 
larger proportions of overall organizational resources.  
On the other hand, practices in rural areas may already 
have the health records of the vast majority of their 
patients. If they do not share patients with other 
practices, they would not need to use HIEs to 
download other records or further coordinate care with 
other practices. Thus, the potential benefits that 
medical practices in rural areas would gain from 
patients’ consent to share their records on an HIE 
would be capitalized in practices that share a 
considerable number of patients with others.  
Hypothesis 3.2: The location of medical providers 
moderates the relationship between the number 
of patients transferred from other providers and 
the provider’s likelihood of asking for consent, 
such that when a provider is located in an urban 
setting, the association between the number of 
transferred patients and the likelihood of asking 
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for consent is weaker than it is when the provider is 
located in a rural setting.  
As with other types of information systems, a user’s 
knowledge of the HIE system and its benefits gradually 
improves over time as the user gains more experience. 
Previous research (Yaraghi, Du, Sharman, Gopal, 
Ramesh, 2015) illustrates that medical practices become 
more efficient in using HIEs as they learn more about it 
over time. In addition to the learning effect, practices that 
have longer experiences with HIEs are those that have 
adopted HIEs sooner. Such practices tend to be more 
technologically savvy and organizationally ready and 
have more positive attitudes and opinions about HIEs 
and therefore benefit more from their patients’ consent to 
share their records on an HIE as compared to practices 
that have adopted an HIE more recently and have less 
experience with it.  
Hypothesis 3.3: The tenure of a medical provider with 
an HIE increases the likelihood of asking for 
consent. 
3.4 Providers’ Risks from Obtaining 
Consent to Share Records on an HIE 
Despite the significant benefits of HIEs for patients, 
some medical providers may prefer not to share records 
of their patients with their peers. As other service 
providers, medical practices also compete with each 
other for patients and do not want to lose them to other 
medical providers. Restricting access to medical records 
is a very effective way to retain patients and inhibit them 
from migrating to other providers. According to the 
estimates of Baker, Bundorf, & Kessler (2015), in states 
where it is easier and cheaper for patients to obtain their 
medical records, the proportion of patients who switch 
their primary care physicians and specialists increases by 
11% and 13%, respectively. Prior research identifies 
competition among medical providers as a barrier for 
their engagement in HIEs (Desai, 2014) and shows that 
providers who are more competitive, such as for-profit 
hospitals and those with smaller market shares, are much 
less likely to engage in HIE efforts (Adler-Milstein & 
Jha, 2014). Hence, medical practices located in more 
competitive markets may be more inclined to more 
tightly control their patients’ medical records in order to 
dissuade them from seeking service from other providers 
within the same medical specialty. Since HIEs eliminate 
providers’ strategic control over their patients’ medical 
records, those who practice in more competitive areas 
face higher risks of losing their patients to other 
competitors and are may be less likely to encourage their 
patients to provide consent.  
Note that the HIE in this study, HEALTHeLINK, 
provides its services to medical providers free of charge 
because it is funded by local and state governments. 
Thus, medical practices do not bear any direct financial 
costs from using the HIE.   
Hypothesis 4: Medical providers who are located in 
more competitive markets are less likely to ask for 
consent. 
4 Conceptual Framework 
We develop a bivariate probit model to analyze the 
effects of the above-mentioned factors on the decisions 
of medical practices and patients to, respectively, ask for 
and provide consent. Poirier (1980) first introduced this 
model to provide a utility-maximizing rationalization for 
binary choice problems where the observed binary 
outcome does not reflect the choice of a single decision 
maker, but rather the binary joint choices of two decision 
makers. That is, two agents engage in a sequential 
decision-making process in which the decision of the 
second agent depends on that of the first agent and is only 
observed if the first agent makes a certain type of 
decision. A classic example is provided by Gunderson 
(1974), who estimates the probability that an employer 
retains a trainee after the completion of the training 
program. In this scenario, the employer first has to decide 
whether or not to offer a job to the trainee and then the 
trainee has to decide whether or not to accept the offer. 
The final outcome is a function of the preferences of two 
different agents; however, we do not observe the 
decisions of each agent separately, but rather only 
observe if the trainee is hired. In this case, even if the two 
decisions were independent, the outcome variable could 
not be correctly be assumed to have a univariate probit 
distribution. Another example is provided by Boyes, 
Hoffman, & Low (1989), who estimate the probability of 
loan defaults assuming that the bank and the individual 
engage in a sequential decision-making process in which 
the bank first decides whether to provide a loan to a 
customer and then the customer decides whether to 
default on the loan. In this case, we can observe the 
customer’s decision only if the bank decided to provide 
the loan. The same model was later used by Greene 
(1992) to estimate the probability of default on credit 
card loans. More recently, such models have been 
applied in a wide variety of contexts, from detecting 
corporate fraud (Khanna, Kim & Lu, 2015; Wang, 
Winton & Yu, 2010) and measuring the spillover 
benefits of homeownership (Coulson & Li, 2013), to 
analyzing the benefits of insurance on health 
expenditures (Galárraga, Sosa-Rubí, Salinas-Rodríguez 
& Sesma-Vázquez, 2010) and estimating the demand for 
subsidized childcare (Wrohlich, 2008). Following the 
notation of Greene, (2000, p. 849) we define the utility 
functions of the medical practice and the patient from, 
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∗are the latent utility functions of the 
practice and the patient and 𝒙𝟏 and 𝒙𝟐 are the vectors of 
covariates that defined the respective utility functions. A 
practice will ask for consent only if 𝑦1






Similarly, a patient will provide consent only if 𝑦2
∗ > 0. 
As discussed before, the consent process is initiated by 
the medical practices. Therefore, if a medical practice 
does not ask a patient for consent, the choice of the 
patient will remain unknown. In our data set, the choice 
of the patients in such cases is shown by 𝑢 and thus we 
observe three types of patient consents. 
𝑦2 = {
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Assuming that the error terms in utility functions have 
a standard normal distribution and are correlated 
together with a covariance of 𝜌 , we can define a 
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function for 
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in which 𝜑(𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝜌)  is the bivariate normal 
distribution’s density function. This allows us to define 
the probabilities of observing the three types of 
consents as following 
𝑃(𝑦2 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑦1
∗ > 0 ∩ 𝑦2
∗ > 0) =
𝑃(𝜖1 < 𝜷𝟏
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∗ > 0 ∩ 𝑦2
∗ ≤ 0) =
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The log-likelihood function will be simply derived as 
Log 𝓵













Note that the bivariate probit model developed here is 
analogous to the seemingly unrelated regressions 
model except that the dependent variables are binary 
indicators (Chatla & Shmueli, 2017; Zellner, 1962).  
In the next section, we provide the estimates of the 
above model along with a series of alternative models 
and robustness tests. 
5 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we first describe the variables used. 
We then present our main results followed by 
robustness tests. 
5.1 Variable Description 
The dependent variable in our models is categorical. It 
is marked as “u” for unknown consent choices, equals 
1 if the patient has provided consent, and 0 otherwise.   
Based on our discussion in the prior section, we use the 
following independent variables in our model. Medical 
records show the number of unique records (laboratory 
reports, radiology reports, and hospital transcriptions) 
that are created over the two years prior to the date of 
consent and are available for each patient on the HIE 
database. Note that even if patients do not provide 
consent, their medical records are still available on the 
HIE; however, these records are not accessible to HIE 
members. For each patient, the number of involved 
physicians is equal to the number of unique physicians 
who have ordered medical reports for that patient. 
Stigma is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the 
patient has a medical record created by a physician 
with a medical specialty in psychiatry and behavioral 
health.  
Since physicians within the same medical specialty 
compete with each other over a limited number of 
potential patients in their locality, we measure 
competition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) based on the market share of physicians with the 
same specialty at the zip code level. To calculate the 
market share of each physician, we divided the number 
of patients seen by the physician by the total number 
of patients seen by other physicians with the same 
specialty and in the same zip code. Although some 
researchers use hospital service areas (HSAs) and 
hospital referral regions (HRRs) as groups of zip codes 
representing segments the health care market (Baker, 
2001), we consider each zip code as a single market 
segment for two reasons. First, methods that group zip 
codes together and segment the market into larger units 
are appropriate for studies that use data sets from much 
larger geographical regions, such as states or the whole 
United States. By defining larger markets, these 
methods significantly reduce the variation in the data set 
and cannot adequately describe the microcompetitive 
behavior among providers in smaller local markets 
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(Sohn, 2002). This study is based on the much smaller 
geographical area of western New York and therefore 
using single zip codes as segments of the market allows 
us to study competition at microlevels between 
providers. Second, segmentation methods that group a 
large number of zip codes together are primarily 
designed to define markets for major and large 
providers such as hospitals. While hospitals treat 
patients across a large market, smaller medical 
practices treat patients from much smaller local 
markets concentrated in their close vicinities. Since our 
data set also includes small medical practices that 
compete with each other in local markets, single zip 
codes constitute much more appropriate market 
segments for calculating competition (HHI) for the 
purposes of this study.  
To calculate the referrals for a specific physician, we 
created a social network in which nodes represent 
medical practices and directed links represent the flow 
of patients between them. In this network, the 
normalized in-degree centrality of a focal practice is 
calculated as the number of unique patients that had 
medical records created on the order of other medical 
practices prior to the date of consent. Tenure measures 
the number of months that a medical practice has been 
using an HIE. Finally, we control for the location of 
physician offices using an indicator variable, rural, 
which is equal to 1 if the zip code in which a physician 
practices is not classified as a core metropolitan area 
by United States Department of Agriculture.1   
Our data set includes a sample of 12,444 patients who 
visited 186 medical practices in western New York.  Of 
these patients, 965 (~7.8%) were not asked to provide 
consent and, therefore, their choice of consent is 
unknown and market with “u” in our data set. The 
remaining 11,479 patients were asked to provide 
consent—of these 709 patients (~6.1%) did not agree 
to do so. To ensure that the low percentage of 
observations with “unknown” or “no” consent types 
were not due to a clerical oversight or data entry error, 
we created a random sample of fifty patients who either 
did not provide consent or their consent type was 
marked as unknown. HEALTHeLINK verified that all 
of the consent types in the sample were correctly 
identified and there were no errors in data entry. The 
verification process involved comparing the archive of 
paper records on which consent was obtained with the 
electronic database in which consent type was 
indicated. A short description of the main variables is 
presented in Table A1.2 Summary statistics along with 
correlations among of the variables are provided in 
Table A2. 
                                                          
1 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-  
urban-commuting-area-codes/documentation.aspx 
 
5.2 Main Results 
We use the NLMIXED procedure in SAS 9.3 to 
implement the maximum likelihood estimation method 
to fit our models. In order to better study the interaction 
terms and the effects of variables that pertain to two 
units (medical practices and patients), we standardized 
all continuous variables with a standard deviation of 1 
around the zero mean.   
We first run a simple probit model to estimate the 
probability that a medical practice asks a patient for 
consent. This is equivalent to estimating a probit model 
using the link function defined in Equation 9. In this 
model, the dependent variable is a binary and is equal to 
one if the final consent choice of the patient is either 1 
or 0 and is equal to 0 if the final consent choice of the 
patient is unknown. In our data set, practices appear 
multiple times because each practice provides medical 
services to many patients. However, patient consent is 
rarely asked for more than once and those who were 
asked were extremely unlikely to change their consent 
type. Of the 12,444 patients, only 813 (6.5%) patients 
were asked more than once to provide consent; of these, 
only 63 (0.5%) patients changed their consent type. Due 
to the very small percentage of patients who changed 
their consent type, we pooled them all together and 
ignored patient-level fixed effects. To account for the 
unobservable factors that lead to potential correlation 
among the decisions of patients who visit the same 
practice, the standard errors of observations are 
clustered within each practice.   
Column 1 of Table A3 shows the estimates of a model 
in which the utility of practices is only a function of 
practice benefits. While the practice benefits increase 
the likelihood of asking for consent, the risks, as 
captured by the level of competition (HHI), do not have 
any significant effect on reducing the likelihood of 
asking for consent. Column 2 shows the estimates when 
the patient-level characteristics are also added to the 
model. In both models, in-degree centrality is positive 
and significant, which confirms that practices that treat 
a greater number of patients transferred from other 
providers are more likely to ask their patients for 
consent. Interestingly, when we include patient 
characteristics in Column 2, the number of physicians 
involved and the interaction of this number with the 
volume of medical records are both positive and 
significant. That implies that medical practices consider 
patient benefits patients in their decision to ask for 
consent.  
We then focus on the consent choice of the patients. If 
we simply remove the observations with unknown 
consent type from our data set, we can model the final 
2 All tables are located in the Appendix. 
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consent choice as a binary variable that is equal to 1 if 
the patient has provided consent and 0 otherwise. Note 
that these estimates are based on a limited data set from 
which 965 observations with unknown consent choices 
were removed, and thus only includes 11,479 
observations with consent choices equal to either 0 or 1. 
Column 3 shows the estimates of a probit model in 
which the utility of a patient is only a function of patient 
characteristics, while Column 4 shows the estimates of 
a model that, in addition to patient characteristics, 
controls for practice characteristics. We observe that the 
number of medical records, physicians involved, and 
their interaction are all positively associated with the 
likelihood of providing consent while none of the 
practice characteristics are correlated with the final 
choice.  
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 show the estimates of the 
bivariate probit model of Equation 10. Column 5 
presents the estimates of a model in which the utility 
functions of practices and patients are driven by, 
respectively, practice and patient characteristics, while 
Column 6 shows the estimates of a model in which the 
utility of medical practices is a function of both patient 
and practice characteristics and, similarly, the utility of 
patients is also a function of both patient and practice 
characteristics. In both of the models, the covariance 
between the error terms of the two utility functions are 
estimated and shown as ρ, which in both Columns 5 and 
6 is statistically insignificant, implying that there exists 
no unobserved factor that affects both patient and 
practice choices.  
These models confirm our previous findings; practices, 
rural location and the ratio of patients with medical 
records created by other practices, as captured by in-
degree centrality, are strongly associated with the 
likelihood of asking for consent. These variables 
represent the benefits to practices of obtaining patients’ 
consent to share medical records on an HIE. On the 
other hand, potential risks, as captured by competition 
(HHI), have no statistically significant effect on 
reducing a practice’s likelihood for asking for consent. 
The privacy decisions of patients follow a privacy 
calculus as well; patients with stigmatized medical 
conditions are less likely to give consent and those with 
a large number of medical records and involved 
physicians are more likely to do so. Most interestingly, 
while medical practices consider the benefits of their 
patients in their decision to ask them for consent, 
patients are not influenced by medical practices and, 
instead, make their privacy decisions based on an 
examination of their own risks and benefits. 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
Note that when a medical practice asks for patient 
consent, it does not mean that it necessarily 
“recommends” that patients give consent. To distinguish 
this difference, we consider a process in which the 
medical practice first makes its recommendation and 
then the patient makes the final choice. We estimate the 
probability of asking for consent as a proxy for the 
strength of the provider’s recommendation to a patient 
for providing consent. This is based on the assumption 
that practices with higher probabilities of asking for 
consent are those that provide stronger 
recommendations for giving consent. In this process, the 
medical practice influences the patient by offering a 
recommendation, and the patient, in turn, considers this 
recommendation, along with personal factors, to reach 
the final consent decision. To capture this process, we 
modeled the utility of the patient as a function of patient 
characteristics, along with an estimated probability of 
asking for consent, as a proxy for the strength of the 
consent recommendation calculated for practices based 
on the estimates presented in Column 1. That is, we 
estimated a probit model in which the consent choice 
was a function of patient characteristics and one 
additional variable representing the strength with which 
a practice recommends consent. The values of his new 
variable (P), by definition, will be between 0 and 1 and 
can be interpreted as the level of effort that a practice 
invests in persuading a patient to provide consent. 
Including this variable in the model allowed us to 
examine how large the influence of medical practices is 
on patient consent decisions. Although the estimated P 
has a positive sign, it is not statistically significant and 
provides further confirmation of our main results that 
indicate that patients are not substantially driven by their 
physicians’ recommendations and that, rather, they 
consider their own risks and benefits when deciding 
whether to share their medical records on an HIE.  
To further check the robustness of our main results, we 
considered other estimation strategies. First, we 
replicated our main estimation models on a smaller 
stratified sample in which the ratio of “unknown” and 
“no consent” types were higher. Second, we 
transformed “unknown” consent types to “no consent” 
in order to construct a binary outcome and then 
estimated a zero-inflated binomial model using both 
probit and logit link functions to make sure that the 
estimates were robust even in the context of other 
function types. We discuss these strategies below.  
In our sample, only a small percentage of patients were 
either not asked to provide consent or refrained from 
providing consent despite being asked to. These 
percentages, however, are still relatively high and do not 
qualify as  a rare event in the context of our data set.  
King and Zeng (2001) define such data sets as those that 
have “dozens to thousands of times fewer ones (events, 
such as wars, vetoes, cases of political activism, or 
epidemiological infections) than zeros.” More 
importantly, the problem of rare events concerns not so 
much the percentage of times an event happens as the 
overall number of cases. For example, an event with 
only a 2% chance of happening is considered rare in a 
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sample of 1000 observations because it only constitutes 
20 events; however, in a sample of 10,000 cases, the 
same event with a 2% probability then happens 200 
times and problem of underestimating the probability of 
the rare event is no longer an issue. In our case, the event 
of “no consent” has a relatively low chance of 
happening (~8%) however since we have a fairly large 
sample (N = 12,444), the frequency of this event is very 
high (N = 813). Therefore, our model parameters would 
not be overestimated. Even if we were dealing with a 
data set of rare events, only the intercepts would be 
overestimated and the slopes that test our hypotheses 
would remain consistent and unbiased.  
Although the nonevents in our data are not significantly 
rare, we considered a conservative approach and 
conducted oversampling from our original data set to 
create a smaller data set with a higher percentage of no 
or unknown consent responses. To create the smaller 
sample, we first selected all of the observations with 
zero or unknown consent, and then randomly selected 
roughly 10% of the remaining observations with a 
consent equal to 1, stratified by the medical practice. 
The resulting data set includes the consent status of 2836 
patients within 186 medical practices. Similar to the 
original sample, 965 (~34%) patients were not asked to 
provide consent and therefore their choice is unknown. 
From those that were asked to provide consent, 709 
(~37%) patients did not agree to do so. Note that all of 
the 186 medical practices of the original data set also 
appear in the smaller data set and therefore the summary 
statistics of practice-level characteristics remain the 
same. Table A4 presents the summary statistics of the 
smaller data set and provides comparisons with the 
original data set. While the averages of the number of 
doctors, age, and stigma variables in the smaller data set 
are statistically different from those of the original data 
set, their differences are not economically significant. 
Table A5 presents the estimates of our models on the 
smaller data set. The estimates are similar in terms of 
(positive/negative) sign and significance to those that 
were based on the original data set, except that the 
estimates of stigma were negative, but not statistically 
significant. This is because we stratified our sample 
based on the dependent variable and since only a small 
proportion of patients in the larger sample had 
stigmatized conditions, our stratified sample includes an 
even smaller number of patients with such conditions 
and therefore the estimates of this variable become 
insignificant.   
We can convert “u” consents to 0 and estimate a zero-
inflated binomial model. As mentioned earlier in the 
paper, the state of New York has mandated an opt-in 
policy for HIE membership and, thus, unless patients 
explicitly provide consent, HIE members cannot access 
their medical records. That means that HIE members 
cannot access the records of patients with unknown 
consent—it is as if they had explicitly refused to provide 
consent. Therefore, in practice, the “u” consent is similar 
to no consent because the records are, in either case, not  
accessible.   
We therefore have a zero-inflated data set in which the 
zeros are the outputs of two binomial processes: either 
the medical providers did not ask for consent or patients 
refused to provide consent despite being asked by the 
medical providers. The 1s on the other hand only happen 
when medical providers ask for the consent and the 
patients agree to provide it. Following the notation of 
Section 4, assuming a probit link function, the 
probabilities of the two consent types will be as follows: 
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And the log-likelihood function will be: 
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Similarly, if we use a logit link function, the log-
likelihood function will be defined as follows: 
Log 𝓵 = ∑ Ln [1 + exp(𝜷𝟏
′ 𝒙𝟏) +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡=0
exp (𝜷𝟐
′ 𝒙𝟐)] − Ln(1 + exp (𝜷𝟏
′ 𝒙𝟏)) −
Ln(1 + exp (𝜷𝟐
′ 𝒙𝟐)) + ∑ 𝜷𝟏
′ 𝒙𝟏 +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡=1
𝜷𝟐
′ 𝒙𝟐 − Ln(1 + exp(𝜷𝟏
′ 𝒙𝟏)) − Ln(1 +
exp(𝜷𝟐
′ 𝒙𝟐))   
(14) 
We provide the estimates of Equations 13 and 14 in 
Table A6. Column 1 provides the estimates of a zero-
inflated probit model in which the utilities of practices 
and patients are only a function of, respectively, practice 
and patient characteristics, and Column 2 shows the 
estimates of a zero-inflated probit model in which the 
utility functions consist of both practice and patient 
characteristics for both agents. The estimation results of 
the logit counterparts of these models are presented in 
Columns 3 and 4.  
Table A7 summarizes the results of our hypotheses 
based on the estimates that we obtained from our main 
model and the three subsequent models that we ran as 
robustness tests. While the estimates are consistent in 
terms of (positive/negative) sign, their level of statistical 
significance varies across the models. This is primarily 
due to the fact that both the samples and the estimation 
methods are different. However, in all models we 
observe that in asking for consent, physicians assign 
significant weight to patient benefits, and in deciding 
whether to provide consent, patients take their own risks 
and benefits into account rather than merely relying on 
physician recommendations. 
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6 Conclusion 
The percentage of hospitals that use an electronic health 
records (EHR) system grew from 9.4% in 2008 to 
96.9% in 2014 (Charles et al., 2013). With the 
widespread adoption of EHRs, exchanging medical 
information has become more important than ever. HIE 
platforms are one of the most viable approaches for 
seamless exchange of medical information. Despite 
their potential, the success of HIEs hinges on the consent 
of patients. Without patient consent, HIEs cannot 
operate and, consequently, their potential to improve the 
quality and reduce the costs of health care will not be 
realized.  Therefore, it is critical to understand the 
factors that affect patients’ choices and examine how 
patients make decisions about disclosing their medical 
information on HIEs. To the best of our knowledge, this 
research is the first study in this direction.  
In this study we examine patients’ decisions to disclose 
their medical records on HIE platforms and investigate 
the role of physicians in such decisions. Contrary to 
common belief, we observe that when given a chance to 
make a decision about their privacy preferences, patients 
do not merely follow the recommendation of their 
physicians but rather carefully consider the risks and 
benefits of providing consent. For patients, the number 
of physicians involved in their medical care, volume of 
medical records on the HIE, and the interaction between 
these two factors are positively associated with the 
likelihood of providing consent. On the other hand, the 
existence of medical records related to stigmatized 
conditions, such as behavioral health issues and mental 
illness, is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
providing consent. Our research shows that medical 
providers do not refrain from exchanging health 
information due to fear of losing their market share to 
their competitors. We show that provider decisions to 
ask for consent are positively associated with the 
potential benefits of the HIE for themselves and their 
patients rather than the financial risks of the HIE that 
medical providers may face because of patients’ 
potential migration to other providers. 
6.1 Policy Implications 
The results of this research yield clear directions for 
focusing efforts on increasing the level of patient 
participation in HIE platforms so that such platforms can 
become effective tools in large-scale health care 
management. These directions are in direct consonance 
with the ongoing national efforts to improve the health 
care system in the US. If patients were to agree to 
disclose their medical information on HIE platforms, 
health care providers could provide better care and avoid 
medical redundancies, which would ultimately result in 
lowering the overall cost of healthcare services. 
Encouraging patients to provide consent and participate 
in HIE initiatives would be a critically important first 
step in implementing such improvements. The model 
developed in this paper explains the privacy concerns of 
patients and their subsequent consent choices. As such, 
our model could help focus policy efforts concerning 
patient education and community awareness on the 
utility and value HIE platforms in public health. The 
results of this study could also direct these efforts toward 
specific target populations in need of such interventions. 
The results of this study will also be of significant 
interest to HIE platforms seeking to enhance their value 
propositions to their participating members. The volume 
of accessible data on HIE platforms is directly 
proportional to the percentage of patients who provide 
consent. Therefore, the insights of this paper could also 
be applied in designing effective marketing strategies to 
enhance the level of consent among patients, ultimately 
increasing the value of an HIE to its members. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Work 
Given data limitations, some important variables are 
not included in our models. For example, peer 
pressure, which could be a strong driver of patient 
consent, is not included in this study. There are 
multiple unobserved confounding factors that may 
explain the correlation between different practice- and 
patient-level characteristics and the final disclosure 
decision. Without controlling for these factors, the 
reported coefficients might be endogenous. For 
instance, one such unobserved factor is the severity of 
the patient’s illness. This factor may explain multiple 
relationships observed in the data, including the 
positive effect of a patient’s age and the number of 
doctors involved in his or her care on the patient’s 
decision to disclose information on the HIE. As we 
discussed in Section 3.1, it is possible that patients with 
more severe illnesses are more likely to see multiple 
physicians, and also more likely to be willing to share 
their medical records. As such, it is possible that the 
relationship between number of physicians and the 
willingness to disclose may be coincidental rather than 
causal. This limitation could be overcome by 
controlling for risk-adjustment index based on 
Elixhauser comorbidities. We were not able to 
implement this method because diagnosis codes are 
recorded in EMR systems at the practices and were not 
available on the HIE we used. Future analysis of more 
granular data could shed more light on patient privacy 
decisions.  
We also observe that some patients were asked for their 
consent multiple times. Such patients may provide 
consent eventually. The number of times that a patient 
is asked to provide consent could be considered as a 
proxy for the pressure. It would be interesting to 
examine if and how such pressure could lead patients 
to provide consent, as this information could help  
design efficient processes to obtain patient consent.  
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Another potential for future research could be a 
nationwide comparison of privacy decisions among 
different HIEs. As we discussed earlier in the paper, 
HEALTHeLINK is quite successful compared to other 
HIEs, as a significantly higher percentage of medical 
providers than typical have adopted its services and, 
due to its local marketing efforts, a considerable 
portion of patients have agreed to disclose their 
medical records (Holmgren, Patel, & Adler-Milstein, 
2017). This is partly due to the fact that 
HEALTHeLINK has received strong support from 
state government, local insurance companies, and 
regional medical providers. Unlike the majority of 
HIEs, HEALTHeLINK is financially visible (Adler-
Milstein et al., 2016). Additionally, HEALTHeLINK 
operates in a market with unique privacy regulations. 
Unlike many other states, New York has adopted an 
opt-in policy requiring HIEs to obtain explicit consent 
from patients before sharing their records. In states that 
have implemented an opt-out policy, the dynamics of 
decision-making may be very different. Given these 
differences in the HIE itself and the conditions of the 
market in which it operates, the results of this study 
may not be generalizable to other HIEs.
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Tenure Number of months since HIE adoption  
Rural  The location of the medical practice, which is equal to 1 if it is rural and 0 otherwise 
HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated using the market share of physicians with the 
same specialty at the zip code level. To calculate the market share of each physician, 
the number of patients seen by the physician is divided by the total number of patients 
seen by other physicians with the same specialty and in the same zip code. 















 Records The number of medical records available on the HIE at the time of consent 
Physicians 
The number of different physicians who have ordered medical reports for a patient up 
to the time of consent 
Stigma 
= 1 if patient has a medical record ordered by a psychiatrist or a behavioral health 
specialist 
Age  Age of the patient in years 
Male = 1 if patient is male and 0 otherwise 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics 





Doctors Stigma Age 
Tenure 27.0826 3.1786         
Rural 0.1677 0.3736 
0.15216 
< .0001 
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Table A3. Consent Choice (Probit Model in Original Data Set) 
 Model 
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(0.0239) 
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Model 1: Estimates the probability that a practice asks for consent when only practice-level characteristics are included in the model. DV is 
equal to 1 if the final consent choice of the patient is known and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Model 2: Estimates the probability that a practice asks for consent when both practice and patient level characteristics are included in the model. 
DV is equal to 1 if the final consent choice of the patient is known and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Model 3: Estimates the probability that a patient agrees to provide consent when only patient level characteristics are included in the model. DV 
is equal to 1 if the patient has provided consent and 0 otherwise. These estimates are based on a limited data set from which 965 observations 
with unknown consent choices were removed. 
Model 4: Estimates the probability that a patient agrees to provide consent when both practice and patient level characteristics are included in 
the model. DV is equal to 1 if the patient has provided consent and 0 otherwise. These estimates are based on a limited data set from which 965 
observations with unknown consent choices were removed. 
Model 5: Estimates the joint probability that a patient gives consent conditional on the practice asking for it using the bivariate probit model of 
Equation 10, in which the utility functions of practices and patients are exclusively driven by, respectively, practice and patient characteristics. 
Model 6: Estimates the joint probability that a patient gives consent conditional on the practice asking for it using the bivariate probit model of 
Equation 10 in which the utility of medical practices is a function of both patient and practice characteristics and, similarly, the utility of 
patients is also a function of both patient and practice characteristics. 
 
 
Table A4. Summary Statistics on Stratified Data Set and Comparisons with the Original Data Set 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 𝑯𝟎: 𝝁𝒍 − 𝝁𝒔 = 𝟎 
Medical records  5.6513   9.8264 0.3281 
Doctors  0.8766    1.0688  2.17** 
Stigma  0.0063    0.0794  -2.37** 
Age 46.5087 23.994      8.26*** 
Male  0.3434     0.4749 1.25 








Table A5. Consent Choice (Probit Model in Stratified Data Set) 
 Model 



































































































Medical records  
 0.0816** 
(0.0330) 






   







   
 0.0425***       
(0.0145) 
Stigma  
 0.0302  
(0.0246) 




 0.0445*  
(0.0249) 
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Notes: *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Model 1: Estimates the probability that a practice asks for consent when only practice-level characteristics are included in the model. DV is 
equal to 1 if the final consent choice of the patient is known and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Model 2: Estimates the probability that a practice asks for consent when both practice and patient level characteristics are included in the model. 
DV is equal to 1 if the final consent choice of the patient is known and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Model 3: Estimates the probability that a patient agrees to provide consent when only patient level characteristics are included in the model. DV 
is equal to 1 if the patient has provided consent and 0 otherwise. These estimates are based on a limited data set from which 965 observations 
with unknown consent choices were removed. 
Model 4: Estimates the probability that a patient agrees to provide consent when both practice and patient level characteristics are included in 
the model. DV is equal to 1 if the patient has provided consent and 0 otherwise. These estimates are based on a limited data set from which 965 
observations with unknown consent choices were removed. 
Model 5: Estimates the joint probability that a patient gives consent conditional on the practice asking for it using the bivariate probit model of 
Equation 10, in which the utility functions of practices and patients are exclusively driven by, respectively, practice and patient characteristics. 
Model 6: Estimates the joint probability that a patient gives consent conditional on the practice asking for it using the bivariate probit model of 
Equation 10 in which the utility of medical practices is a function of both patient and practice characteristics and, similarly, the utility of patients 
is also a function of both patient and practice characteristics. 
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Table A6. Zero-Inflated Binomial Model with Probit and Logit Link Functions 































































































































































 1.2696***    
(0.02423) 
   21.3831***  
    (4.4048) 














 0.03894**    
(0.01965) 
 0.06185     
(0.1809) 























 0.1888***   
(0.01617) 
 0.09763     
(0.1194) 





 0.03192   
(0.03407) 







 3.5310***     
(0.8219) 
 
   23.3177*** 
    (4.5854) 
Tenure^2  
-3.0446***    
(0.6742) 
 
  -19.0081*** 
 (3.6926) 
Rural  
   15.4776***          
    (3.1656) 
 
  105.21*** 
(21.7672) 











  (6.6038) 
In-degree Centrality×Rural  
 163.39*** 
  (32.9371) 
 
   194.28*** 
 (32.9978) 
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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H1.1: An increase in the number of a patient’s medical records leads to 
an increase in the likelihood of providing consent.  
S S NS NS 
H1.2: An increase in the number of a patient’s medical providers leads 
to an increase in the likelihood of providing consent.  
S S PS PS 
H1.3: The number of medical providers moderates the relationship 
between the number of medical records and a patient’s likelihood of 
consent such that when the number of medical providers is lower, the 
association between the number of medical records and the likelihood 
of consent is weaker than it is when the number of medical providers is 
higher. 
S PS NS NS 
H2: Patients with stigmatized medical conditions are less likely to 
provide consent.   
PS NS S PS 
H3.1: Medical providers who treat more patients transferred from other 
providers are more likely to ask patients for consent.  
S S S S 
H3.2: The location of medical providers moderates the relationship 
between the number of patients transferred from others and the 
provider’s likelihood of asking for consent such that when a provider is 
located in an urban setting, the association between the number of 
transferred patients and the likelihood of asking for consent is weaker 
than it is when the provider is located in a rural setting.  
NS NS S PS 
H3.3: The tenure of a medical provider with an HIE increases the 
likelihood of asking for consent. 
NS NS PS PS 
H4: Medical providers who are located in more competitive markets 
are less likely to ask for consent.   
NS NS PS NS 
Notes: 
S: Supported with p < 0.1  
NS: Not supported with p < 0.1 
PS: Partially supported: Significant at p < 0.1 at either the main model or the 
model with controls. 
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